The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's majority decision announced Friday to seek staff and industry views on new safety regulations based on Japan's nuclear disaster is a sharp rebuff to its chairman, Gregory Jaczko, and his authoritative use of his chairman's powers, commission voting statements show.

The commissioner agreed to consider by next month which of the dozen major recommendations by the NRC's Fukushima task force could move forward expeditiously. But over Jaczko's objections, the four other NRC commissioners backed a process that, by Jackzo's own interpretation, reduces his authority over the Fukushima review agenda and gives more control to the other commissioners.

In a statement explaining his vote on the task force issues, Jaczko said his colleagues had united behind a plan that he called ineffective and "micro-management," creating a voting process that "encourages the commission to sidestep the actual substantive policy issues presented."

He also expressed strong opposition to an approach proposed by Commissioner Kristine Svinicki that requires the NRC staff to create a "charter" for the next round of NRC reviews of regulatory changes stemming from the meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex. That approach limits the leeway of the NRC's executive director for operations -- who reports to the chairman -- Jaczko said.

The other commissioners supported Svinicki, whose protests of Jaczko's behavior have gone public, fueling sharp criticism of Jaczko by congressional Republicans. Jaczko was an aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.), and Jaczko's efforts to halt NRC review of the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository -- a project vehemently opposed by Reid -- has provoked unusual open criticism by his commission colleagues. Svinicki is a former Republican Senate aide.

It is not clear whether the infighting between the chairman and the other commissioners will significantly affect regulatory changes by the NRC in response to the Fukushima accident, some of which could occur within months and others not for years to come.

The commission decision announced Friday directs the NRC staff to recommend no later than Sept. 9 whether any of the regulatory changes recommended by the NRC's Near-Term Task Force should be implemented "without unnecessary delay." The staff was told to seek input from industry and the public before making this report.

By Oct. 3, the staff is to set priorities and timetables for NRC actions on the task force recommendations, except for the first and most controversial one that called for a better balancing of risk analysis and traditional "defense in depth" approaches in reactor inspections and safety assessments. The staff was given 18 months to consider this task force proposal. Public input was called for here, as well.

A deeper staff review

After the task force submitted its report July 12, Jaczko had proposed an accelerated commission response. Written comments from industry and the public would be solicited and a panel of outside experts would be formed to provide advice. But the commission would vote on the recommendations in October, under the chairman's plan.

However, Jaczko's fellow commissioners insisted that the full NRC staff be allowed to review and advise the commission, and that more opportunity for public input should be created. The top staff felt the same way, according to Svinicki, in her statement on the issue, signed July 19.

She said she reached out to William Borchardt, the NRC's executive director of operations, who asked that the staff be directed to prepare a plan to engage the industry and public and an agenda for acting on the task force proposals, including opportunity for staff feedback, she said. Without a detailed staff response, she said, "I do not have a sufficient basis to accept or reject the recommendations" of the task force.

Commissioner William Ostendorff told a Senate hearing earlier this month that a half-dozen actions could be ordered within months. They include re-evaluating current safety requirements governing earthquake and flooding hazards, including "walk down" inspections and checks of emergency equipment; reviews of reactors' emergency venting systems like those that failed at the Fukushima Daiichi plant; and assessing the ability of plants to withstand an extended loss of regular power supply for reactor and spent fuel cooling operations.

Ostendorff, a Republican commissioner, told Senate Environment and Public Works Committee members that press reports of commission dissension on this agenda were exaggerated. "I think there's a lot more consensus; everybody is ready to move forward," he said. But the same could not be said for the process the commission majority chose to follow.

The statements accompanying the commissioners' votes suggest that their differences are importantly rooted in the ongoing internal struggle over Jaczko's authority as chairman.

NRC Inspector General Hubert Bell, testifying before a House committee in June, said his office had heard complaints from senior officials and other staff about Jaczko's failure to share information with commissioners bearing on NRC decisions. "In addition, a number of interviewees described instances of behavior by the chairman that they viewed as unprofessional or manipulative," Bell reported. Jaczko "acknowledged using forceful management techniques to accomplish his objectives but maintained that these techniques were necessary to facilitate the work of the commission."

As their voting statements show, Jaczko and the other commissioners read the recommendations of the Fukushima task force differently.

Differences on changing U.S. status quo

"I believe the Task Force found that the status quo of our existing regulatory framework is no longer acceptable -- calling for changes to the regulations that we have long relied on for adequate protection," Jaczko said in an Aug. 9 voting statement. The dozen major task force recommendations include changes to buttress reactor defenses against extreme earthquakes or other natural disasters, singly or occurring together, as happened in Japan, and measures to maintain vital cooling of reactor cores and spent fuel pools during extended loss of outside electric power.

"Throughout the report, the task force emphasized that effective NRC action is essential in addressing these challenges and that voluntary industry initiatives are no substitute for strong and effective NRC oversight," Jaczko said.

Ostendorff centered on the task force's summary conclusions that "a sequence of events like those occurring in the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United States and could be mitigated, reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases." Therefore, the commission has the time to engage its staff and the public in reviewing any new regulatory actions, he said.

The commission's divisions on the Fukushima report have been amplified selectively as they passed through political megaphones.

At the Aug. 2 hearing, Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), a nuclear power opponent, came to Jaczko's defense. "Chairman Jaczko, some of my Republican colleagues have kind of suggested that you have initiated a Bolshevik coup on the NRC. You are running a dictatorship to undermine American democratic values." That was unfair, Sanders said.

Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) suggested that the other commissioners' demands for more staff and public input looked like foot-dragging. "It took 90 days for the task force to make their recommendations. It should not take longer than 90 days for the NRC to accept or reject them and move toward implementation. Any stalling will not be viewed favorably by the American people."

Sen. John Barrasso, (R-Wyo.), dismissed the work of the NRC veterans on the task force. "I am not surprised, however, if you put six career regulators in a room for 90 days, that you're going to get a lot of suggestions for more Washington red tape, recommendations that appear to be based on old agendas. This is what I believe we have here before us today."

Confusion over the chairman's emergency powers

The task force concluded that current NRC regulations are "a patchwork of requirements" that include binding regulations and mandatory inspection protocols, and voluntary industry actions that are not subject to regular inspection. To Barrasso, "patchwork" implied a conclusion by the task force that the NRC's regulations were "defective or not working."

"I don't believe that's what the task force said," Jaczko responded.

Ostendorff added that various layers of regulations and requirements had built up in response to the Three Mile Island accident and the 9/11 attacks. But he supported Jaczko's conclusion: "And so I don't think that the patchwork is a fair characterization itself, but I think the chairman's explanation is correct here."

Republican members of the Environment and Public Works Committee grilled Jaczko at the August hearing on his relationship with other commissioners. Sens. James Inhofe (R-Kan.) and James Sessions (R-Ala.) zeroed in on Jaczko's invocation of the chairman's emergency powers after the Japanese crisis erupted in March. (Svinicki says she was told to stay out of the NRC emergency control room at the peak of the crisis.)

The GOP senators asked the four commissioners whether Jaczko had formally notified them that he had ended the emergency powers period and had reported to the commission on his actions during that period, as required by law. The commissioners said Jaczko had not done so.

Jaczko replied that the commissioners "personally have been briefed by me on the status of our situation. We no longer have our Emergency Operations Center activated, which is a clear signal that there would be no emergency powers."

"But, Chairman Jaczko, that's not what they said," Inhofe replied. "They said they have not been notified by you."

"Which is a true statement," Jaczko said, indicating that while he was "signaling" his colleagues, he was not following the letter of the law in his communications, nor, his critics say, the spirit of collegiality that is ingrained in the NRC's traditions. As it approaches the most important review of U.S. nuclear plant safety in a generation, the commission also faces some soul-searching in the way it makes its decisions, its members acknowledge.